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Abstract
This study examined the effect of including a human figure drawing on the
hindsight bias among undergraduate psychology students. Six groups were
given a description of a 15 year-old boy who was experiencing school
difficulties . Some of these groups also were given outcome information
suggesting that the boy's difficulties were due either to social-emotional
problems or to learning problems . In addition , some groups also were given a
human figure drawing made by the boy. Participants then assigned likelihood
probabilities to the two outcomes. Results of non-parametric analyses showed
the hindsight bias for only one of the six groups. In contrast , results of
parametric analyses showed a main effect for the outcome variable . Results
are discussed in terms of previous research on the hindsight bias.
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Introduction
A common argument for using human figure drawings as part of a
psychological test battery is that, at best, they might provide some clinical
information or at least help to establish rapport with a client , and , at worst , they
might prove irrelevant (Fuller & Goh, 1983; Kennedy , Faust , Willis , & Piotrowski ,
1994; Lubin, Larsen, & Matarazzo , 1994; Piotrowski , Sherry , & Keller, 1985;
Piotrowski and Zalewski , 1993). Given the considerable research (Arkes,
Wortmann , Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Chapman and Chapman , 1967; Fischhoff,
1975; Fischhoff and Beyth , 1975; Hawkins and Hastie , 1990) examining the effect
of biases on the accuracy of clinical decisions, however , it is reasonable to
wonder if including irrelevant data could potentially exacerbate bias. Because the
hindsight bias is well documented , it could provide a useful methodology for
assessing this hypothesis . Thus, the goal of the present study was to assess
whether the magnitude of the hindsight bias would be affected by including a
human figure drawing.
In the following review, the Draw-a-Person Test (OAP) first is discussed as
a measure of cognitive ability and then of social-emotional functioning. Included
is an examination of various techniques that have been developed to score the
OAP. Next,a review of the research of the hindsight bias is presented. The
original work of Fischhoff (1975) is described , as well as works that developed
from his original paradigm. Finally , the two topics are integrated to form the
research questions considered .
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The OAP as a Measure of Cognitive Ability
Although study of the use of drawings to estimate intelligence extends
back to the 1880s, the first standardized method was developed in 1926 by
Florence Goodenough with her Draw-a-Man Test. Goodenough (1926) proposed
that there was a relationship between children 's concept development as seen in
drawings and general intelligence . According to Goodenough , drawing, to a child,
is language, and children draw what they know , rather than what they see . She
observed that the developmental trends of drawings are remarkably constant
among young children (ages 4 to 10 years) . Finally, she observed that children
with cognitive impairments produce drawings resembling those of younger
children .
Based on these assumptions and observations , Goodenough developed
an objective scoring system that was standardized using 4 ,000 drawings.
Although the majority of her sample was from schools in New Jersey , several
ethnic groups were represented from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds .
The result of this study was a 51-point scale for measuring intelligence from
human figure drawings .
Goodenough (1926) found inter-rater and test-retest reliabilities ranging
from rs= .70 to .90. Comparison of IQs estimated from the drawings with scores
from the Stanford-Binet across separate age groups resulted in an average
correlation of r = .76. In addition, prognosis for school success by teachers and
scores from the drawings were compared and resulted in a correlation of r = .60.
From this work , age norms were developed for children ages 4 to 1O years . It
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was intended as a method of measuring nonverbal intelligence , particularly useful
with non-English speaking and hearing impaired children.
In 1948, John N. Buck published a technique called the House-TreePerson (H-T-P) . He proposed that, in addition to measuring intelligence ,
drawings also could be used to measure personality factors. He postulated that
the H-T-P measured cognitive function in a situation designed to activate nonintellective aspects of the personality that seNe either to enhance or to diminish
the efficiency of intellectual functioning . He further postulated that the method is
a projective (or associative) one, portraying thoughts, feelings, and traits of the
individual. To this end, he proposed that in order to interpret the drawings in
terms of intellectual functioning , one also must interpret the projected personality
aspects of the drawing .
In a revised edition of the manual, Buck ( 1966) described standardization
studies that were done when developing the scale for measuring intelligence .
The standardization sample of 120 participants was carefully selected and ranged
from what today would be termed severely mentally retarded to intellectually
gifted. Buck described the classification procedure in this way: "The ultimate
criterion for inclusion in a level of intellectual function was the clinically
demonstrated level of intellectual function and not a score on one or more
standard intelligence tests" (Buck , 1966, p. 8). These drawings then were
analyzed, and a scoring system was developed . The resulting quantitative
scoring system was outlined in 40 pages in the manual, followed by another 100
pages describing qualitative interpretation, which already had been identified as a
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requirement of interpretation.

In terms of the concurrent validity of the method,

Buck reported correlations ranging from rs = .40 to .70 with scores from the
Stanford-Binet and the Wechsler-Bellevue , with higher correlations restricted to
lower IQ groups (mean IQ= 70). There was no explanation of how estimates
were obtained ; as noted , classifications were not based on standardized tests ,
but instead on clinical presentation . Overall , this method is difficult to use and
lacks the empirical evidence to support its clinical and practical utility in a
psychological test battery .
The Goodenough-Harris Draw-a-Person Test (Harris , 1963) was an
attempt to extend the age norms into adolescence and to devise different forms
of the scale to include a woman figure , as well as a drawing of the self as a
possible method for studying the emerging self-concept. Attempts to develop
adequate norms with adolescents were not successful , providing support for
Goodenough 's original assertion that after the age of 1O years , drawings are less
predictive of intelligence .
More recently , analyses were conducted using the Buck and
Goodenough-Harris scoring systems (Abell , Heiberger, & Johnson , 1994) . The
researchers were interested in examining the relationship between these
measures and scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised
(Wechsler , 1981). Their results showed moderate correlations between
Performance and Full Scale IQs and estimated standard scores from the two
scoring systems , with the Buck system performing slightly better . Further
analysis of these relationships revealed significant differences between the
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estimated scores and WAIS-R scores . Both the Buck and Goodenough systems
significantly underestimated all three IQ scores of the WAIS-R (i.e. , VIQ , PIQ, &
FSIQ) . Overall , the authors concluded that the question regarding the use of
drawings as a measure of cognitive functioning in adults remains equivocal and
warrants further research . This review did not refer to the any of the previously
mentioned concerns regard ing the Buck scoring system.
To address some of the concerns previously discussed , Naglieri ( 1988)
developed the Draw-a-Person : A Quantitative Scoring System (DAP:QSS) . The
purpose of the DAP:QSS was to provide a brief nonverbal measure of ability to
be used either as part of a test battery or as a screening device. The scoring
system used modern scoring criteria and was normed on a large stratified sample
of 2,622 students across the United States ranging in age from 5 to 17 years .
Each individual in the standardization sample provided drawings of a man,
a woman, and the self. Scores provided include both a composite standard
score , as well as standard scores for single drawings based on a 64-item scale .
Age-related changes showed the fastest increase between ages 5 and 9 years ,
and then increased less rapidly. Thus , norms were developed for each age
range, with quarter-year intervals for 5 through 8-year-olds, and half-year
intervals for 9 and 10-year-olds. Ages 11 to 17 years were collapsed into a single
group because their means were quite similar . The internal consistency for the
composite scale ranged from rs= .83 to .89, whereas those for the individual
drawings ranged from rs= .56 to .78.
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Test-retest reliabilities ranged from rs= .60 to .89 across various age
ranges for a four-week interval. These were calculated based on a small sample,
so readers are cautioned to interpret them carefully. Both inter-rater and intrarater reliability estimates were high, ranging from rs= .86 to .97 for children in
Grades 1 to 7. Older age ranges were not evaluated . The reported construct
validity of the DAP:QSS was evaluated in two ways . First, the author suggested
that there should be a developmental change in mean scores . They reported
age-related increases in total raw scores for children ages 5 to 11 years. In order
to establish concurrent validity , drawings were scored using the DAP:QSS and
the Goodenough-Harris scoring system . Resulting correlations ranged from r =
.75 to .84. For Grades Kindergarten through 3, correlations ranged from rs = .28
to .31, and for Grades 4 through 12, ranged from rs= .19 to .27.
Overall , the methodology used to develop the DAP:QSS was sound . It
provides an estimate of non-verbal ability with good reliability . Caution should be
used when using it with children over the age of 11, as its efficacy has not been
established with adolescents . In addition, whereas the rigor with which it was
developed is impress ive , its overall concurrent validity remains questionable .
Kamphaus and Pleiss (1991) reviewed the DAP:QSS . They found that
although this technique was adequately normed and showed good reliability , its
concurrent validity with other comprehensive measures of children 's intelligence
was mediocre. Willis ( 1992) also provided a review of this method. He
concluded that the DAP:QSS was a well-developed screening measure of
general nonverbal ability. Willis cautioned potential users , however , that the DAP
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was neither developed nor validated as a social-emotional assessment technique,
and should not be used as such .
Over the past 75 years, there have been many techniques developed to
measure intelligence with human figure drawings . These methods have
demonstrated variable psychometric properties. In general, correlations are
better for children of lower IQ levels, than average to above -average IQ levels .
Review of various techniques leads to the conclusion that it is possible , using
well-developed, adequately normed tests, to gather an estimate of non-verbal
ability correlated with other standardized tests. These conclusions apply primarily
to young children (ages 5-10 years) , as the current body of research does not
lend support for valid interpretation of drawings of older children and adults .
Overall, reliability tends to be good with recent tests, whereas concurrent and
construct validity have been shown to be less impressive.

The OAP as a Measure of Social-Emotional Functioning
In contrast to its use in cognitive assessment, the use of the OAP in socialemotional and personality assessment is based on the projective hypothesis
(Frank, 1939). This hypothesis states that when an individual structures and
organizes an ambiguous stimulus situation while creating a response , the given
response will at least partially reflect some of the individual 's personality traits .
The more ambiguous the stimulus, the greater the sensitivity of the projection
process. It assumes that the more ambiguous the stimulus , the less likely it will
elicit defensive reactions by clients . Anastasi (1988) suggested that projective
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test materials represent a mechanism by wh ich individuals reveal their needs,
anxieties, conflicts , and thought processes . Major features of projective
techniques include the following : (a) they represent disguised testing procedures ,
(b) they represent a global approach to the appraisal of persona lity, and perhaps
most importantly , according to proponents , (c) they reveal covert , latent, or
unconscious aspects of personality (Anastasi , 1988).
Over time, Goodenough and others (Buck, 1948; Hammer, 1958;
Machover , 1949) began to use the OAP to assess social-emotional and
personality variables. Hammer (1958) proposed that figure drawings would allow
individuals to draw pictures of their inner worlds , where beliefs and personality
characteristics could be expressed, and strengths and weaknesses exposed .
Handler (1996) proposed several advantages to Draw-a-Person techn iques. For
example , he stated that the OAP is an easy task for most individuals and that it
usually elicits cooperation in the assessment process. He further suggested that
because children with internalized disorders often do not demonstrate the ir
difficulties overt ly, the OAP could provide an assessment of their discomfort . In
addition , it could prove useful with individuals who are inhibited and non-talkative ,
because it is a relatively nonverbal task . It also allows the clinician to observe the
client's functioning during an unstructured situation , and when compared with
performance on a structured task , the clinician may be able to determine the
extent to which the client needs external structure in order to function . Finally, he
stated that the OAP has few age and intelligence limitations , and can be used

with individuals from various socio-economic and cultural backgrounds .
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Projective drawings such as the OAP often are used to establish rapport
during an interview or evaluation . Kennedy et al. (1994) surveyed school
psychologists about their practice, and discovered that many clinicians state that
they use projectives primarily as a method of generating hypotheses, with a
smaller percentage suggesting they use them primarily to help establish rapport .
Although these appear to be harmless uses of this technique , it is difficult to
measure the impact these drawings may have on overall impressions and
diagnostic decisions . For example , although well intended , clinicians may have
limited awareness of the influence these drawings have on their diagnostic
decisions . Aspel and Willis (1998) found that clinicians' appraisals of how
information influences decisions often is inaccurate .
Although the purpose of projectives usually is disguised , research on the
illusory correlation has demonstrated that people may have preconceived beliefs
about the meaningfulness of certain signs. Illusory correlation refers to a false
belief in the association between variables . It can reflect either a belief in an
association when one is absent , an overestimation of the strength of the
relationship, or a belief of a relationship in one direction when it is actually in the
opposite direction . Chapman and Chapman (1967), in a classic study of the
illusory correlation, found that both clinicians and non-trained college students
made similar inferences about the meaningfulness of particular signs in human
figure drawings . They speculated that these signs led to particular associations
about personality characteristics , regardless of the lack of empirical support for
the validity of those signs.
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With regard to the use of the OAP as a diagnostic tool , illusory beliefs
could exert a significant impact on attempts to mislead the clinician. Specifically,
if the client has any intention or inclination to be less than truthful, it may not be
detected in the OAP and in fact may lead the clinician to disregard other evidence
that may suggest the client is attempting to fake. For example, if the client has
beliefs about the meaningfulness of certain signs in drawings and the clinician
has similar beliefs, then it would be relatively easy to draw a "pathological "
drawing . In addition , given the projective hypothesis, the clinician would be
confident that the drawing represents covert or latent characteristics of the
individual, and may ignore objective indicators of faking.
Critique of the OAP as a projective test. Many methods of drawing
interpretation have been developed; this discussion reviews some of the earliest
work , and then considers how current research and study have used this
information. In 1949, Karen Machover published her manual Personality
Projection in the Drawing of the Human Figure. Its purpose was as a method of
personality analysis based on the interpretation of human figure drawings . The
premise outlined in the book was that the body is a vehicle for self-expression
and that the drawing reflects the individual's self-perception. The picture
represents the whole system of psychic values, specifically drives and needs .
This theory was based on Machover's personal experience as well as those of
colleagues she respected. Machover speculated that "all creative activity bears
the specific stamp of conflict and needs pressing upon the individual who is
creating " (p.4). Although clinical experience and observations are useful for
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generating ideas, scientific study is required to demonstrate the relationship
between these observations and reliable and valid interpretation .
In describing the method that should be employed when using her system ,
Machover cautioned that interpretation should be done only by advanced practice
psychologists with extensive training in psychodynamic theory. In addition, she
recommended that interpretation should not be made in isolation , but instead that
it should be considered in light of the whole clinical picture of the individual. This
recommendation suggests that interpretation is subjective, in that it varies
depending on the individual. Naturally, this raises concern about the reliability
and validity of the measure .
The manual does not refer to specific studies of the psychometric
properties of the technique . Machover (1949) made reference to a comparison of
drawing interpretations with Rorschach and handwriting analysis , stating that
many of them were consistent. No explanation was offered about how this
comparison was made, nor were any statistical analyses cited . In addition ,
Machover suggested that the method had been shown to be useful for prognostic
purposes , yet she did not cite any studies evaluating this.
In the manual, Machover referred four times to the interpretation of pointy
fingers as suggestive of overt aggression or paranoid repression of aggression ,
yet she failed to cite any validation of this sign beyond her own clinical
experience. As will be shown in the discussion of other methods , pointy fingers is
one of many signs that have been interpreted , yet the original source , as well as
those thereafter , failed to offer evidence as to the validity of the sign .
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Overall , the method suggested by Machover (1949) lacks the
psychometric study required to demonstrate its efficacy . The manual does not
mention any use of control groups when developing the technique . In fact,
Machover suggested that the frequency of particular signs should not deter the
clinician from interpreting them . As an example , she referred to the interpretation
of conflict in the treatment of hands as indicating lack of confidence in
achievement and social contacts. She stated that the fact that this is often seen
in drawings suggests that there is a high level of competitiveness in society and
that individuals who exhibit this sign should be interpreted as such. In other
words , the base rate of a particu lar sign should not influence the clinician 's
interpretation of it.

Clearly the lack of scientific validation , as well as inadequate

control groups lead to serious concerns about the usefulness of this technique .
Urban (1963) produced another handbook for the interpretation of signs in
drawings . It was reportedly a summary manual of the work of Buck (1948),
Goodenough (1926) , Hammer (1958), and Machover (1949). The author
recommended that it be used only by those with background in dynamic
personality theories to explore an individual 's inner recesses , denied ,
unacceptable , repressed impulses. He stated, "Acute observers always have
been able to detect emotional connotations in art work " (Urban, 1963, p. 1).
Although the manual did not offer any information about specific studies of validity
and reliability , it did advocate the interpretation of specific signs as indicative of
pathology . For example , pointed fingers are said to be suggestive of aggression ,

and crossed eyes as warnings of severe mental illness (Urban, 1963, p. 61).
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Jolles ( 1964) published A Catalog for the Qualitative Interpretation of the
House-Tree-Person . The manual cites Buck (1948 ), Hammer (1958) , and
Machover ( 1949) as references. It offers specific interpretation of signs in
pictures without referencing sources spec ifically. The manual did not refer to any
psychometric study of the validity of the signs. Similar to the previously
mentioned manual, the work suggests that large , spike-like hands are indicat ive
of aggression and hostil ity. W ithout mention of specific study of this , the reader
assumes that this sign (along with many others) has been translated from the
original work of Machover (1949) , Buck (1948) , and Hammer (1958).
Goldstein and Rawn (1957 ) studied interpretive signs of aggression in
human figure drawings. They hypothesized that experimentally induced feel ings
of aggression would elicit changes in figure drawings consistent with those signs
suggested by Buck (1948) and Machover (1949) as indicators of aggression .
These signs included line pressure , figure placement , and seven spec ific deta ils
generally interpreted as representing aggression (including spiked fingers , slashline mouth , detailed teeth , clenched fists , nostril emphasis , squared shoulders ,
and toes in a non-nude figure). Their sample consisted of 39 male and female
attendants in a state mental hospital. No other descriptors of participants were
mentioned .
Participants were ranked based on measurement of line pressure from
their first drawing and , based on these rankings , alternately assigned to the
expe rimental or control groups . In order to induce feelings of agg ression ,
members of the experimental group were required to wait before drawing their
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second picture, and then were told they would have to work more hours with no
salary increase . No standardized measure of aggression was given at this time,
but was inferred based on "the multitude of spontaneous complaints " (p. 170).
Drawings before and after the aggression induction were compared , as
well as the drawings of both of the control groups. They found that line pressure
and figure size did not support the hypothesis as valid interpretive signs of
aggression . They further reported that the seven sign indicators , when
considered globally, did discriminate between the control and experimental
groups , as well as before and after the aggression induction for the experimental
group . They cautioned that none of the signs individually was a strong predictor ,
only the global ratings. Finally, they had two judges (trained psychologists)
provide subjective impressions of aggression . These impressions proved to be
poor predictors of members of the experimental group . In addition , these judges
reported that they relied on line pressure and figure placement as indicators of
aggression.
The results of this study must be interpreted cautious ly for a variety of
reasons. Of primary concern is the participant pool. Spec ific subject variables
were not identified, including even basic descriptors such as age and gender
distribution . The method by which aggress ion was measured also presents
concern , because its validity was not assessed . Due to these kinds of
methodological issues , at best these results offer equivocal support for the
interpretation of drawings as indicative of aggression.
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More recently , Naglieri, McNeish , and Bardos (1991) developed the Drawa-Person : Screening Procedure for Emotional Disturbance (DAP : SPED). In
contrast with previously mentioned methods that relied on the projective
hypothesis , the objectives of this method were to make interpretations based on
scientifically validated norms. The authors stated that it was intended as a
scor ing system made of items that easily and objectively can be scored . They
also intended to develop a nationally normed system with demonstrated ability to
differentiate between normal and disturbed populations. The reported use of the
method was as a screening procedure to identify individuals for whom further
evaluation is warranted . The authors cautioned that screening was the intended
use and that it should not be used for diagnostic purposes .
The resulting scoring system was a 55-item scale includ ing items taken
from an extensive literature review , that occurred infrequently among normal
individuals, and demonstrated good psychometric properties . Scoring rules are
clear and objective . Global scores are obtained and compared to norms, using T
scores . According to the manual , scores less than 55 suggest further evaluation
is not warranted , scores of 55-64 suggest that further evaluation is indicated , and
scores above 65 suggest that further evaluation is strongly indicated . One issue
that should be considered regarding these cutoffs is the fact that using T scores ,
a score of over 55 (assum ing a normal distribution) would represent over 30% of
the population. The manual did not report the base rate in the population of
children needing evaluation for emotional problems, but clearly 30% is unusually
high.
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The DAP:SPED was standardized with 2,260 individuals aged 5 to 17
years. lntrarater (over a one month time period) and interrater reliabilities were rs
= .83 and .84, respectively. Test-retest reliability was I= .67 over a one-week
time interval. The validity of the system was assessed by four separate studies.
The first study compared mean scores of 81 students in special education
{with emotional and behavioral disorders) with students from the standardization
sample. Mean T-scores were 55.3 for the special education group and 49.5 for
the standardization group . These scores were reliably different from each other,
and the authors concluded that the DAP:SPED validly discriminated between
these two groups .
The second study used a similar methodology , with the clinical sample
drawn from a class for students with serious emotional disturbances . Again ,
results showed mean T-scores of 57 for the clinical sample and 49 for the
standardization group , a reliable difference. The third study used similar
methodology, with the clinical sample being drawn from students in special
education classes for students with emotional disturbances. Comparison of mean
T-scores for the clinical (54.8) and standardization (49.7) groups yielded a reliable
difference . Again , the conclusion was drawn that the DAP:SPED was a good
discriminator between the groups.
The fourth and final study was similar to the others . The clinical sample
was a group of 54 students with serious emotional disturbances who were
enrolled in a day school program . Mean T-scores for the clinical (56.6) and
standardization (49.9) groups once again were reliably different , offering support
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for the DAP:SPED 's discriminatory power. This study was reviewed both in the
manual and separately (Naglieri & Pfeiffer, 1992). Whereas the results reported
in the manual are consistent with those in the article , the authors did not mention
the fact that when group membership was assessed based on a T score cutoff of
55, 78% of the standardization group , yet only 48% of the clinical group were
correctly identified .
Overall , the DAP:SPED is a carefully designed , well normed scoring
system. It demonstrates good reliability , much improvement over its
predecessors. Yet questions regarding its validity remain. For example, the
authors caution many times in the manual that it is a screening procedure only,
and should not be used for diagnostic purposes . They state clearly that it can
help to determine what children may need further evaluation . Yet, review of the
four studies reported in the manual, that used children with serious emotional
disturbances in self-contained classrooms , demonstrated that these groups just
barely reached the cutoff score of 55. Therefore , these studies suggest a
minimal effect size for the clinical group. The clinical implications of the use of
this method include the possibility that individuals who are in need of further
evaluation may not score in the clinically significant range based on this scoring
procedure and therefore will not receive further evaluation . The risk of false
negative results is substantial , and clinicians should be aware of this when using
this method. Conversely , the DAP:SPED is better at correctly identifying
individuals who are not in need of further evaluation , with over 70% of
participants in the standardization group scoring in the non-clinical range.
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Riordan and Verdel (1991) have suggested that in addition to the OAP's
use with a standardized scoring method , it also provides clinically useful
information without a scoring system. They reviewed the use of the Oraw-aPerson to predict sexual abuse in children. They did not refer to any specific
scoring method or procedure to be used for interpretation . They reported specific
signs in children's drawings that suggest that sexual abuse has occurred (e.g.,
eyes closed or without pupils, nose overemphasized , elongated neck). Yet , they
offered only qualitative evidence and did not cite empirical support for these
assertions. In addition , they advocated that the OAP could be used by nontrained individuals as an assessment measure of definite indicators of sexual
abuse. Given the lack of empirical support for these assertions , this report
should be interpreted cautiously .
Feyh and Holmes (1994) attempted to replicate early studies of the
predictive power of particular signs on the OAP with children with conduct
disorders . They used eight indicators of aggression identified by Koppitz (1966)
and Machover (1949). Their results failed to replicate earlier reports , with no
differences in the frequency of particular signs between children with or without
conduct-disorders .
Although these techniques continue to be used frequently by clinicians in
psychiatric clinical settings and in schools (Fuller & Goh, 1983; Kennedy et al.,
1994; Lubin et al., 1984; Piotrowski et al., 1985; Piotrowski & Zalewski , 1993),
questions about their reliability and validity persist. Those methods reviewed have

been cited in more recent manuals for the interpretation of human figure drawings
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(Ogdon, 1990). It is interesting to note that the original works suggested that
further studies need to be conducted , yet the previously mentioned recent manual
primarily referenced these sources.
Given the multitude of research questioning the usefulness of the DAP as
a measure of social-emotional functioning , and yet the tendency for clinicians and
non-trained individuals to interpret it based on intuitive beliefs, its inclusion in a
psychological test battery raises serious concerns. Specifically , the risk of
diagnostic errors is significant. In addition , it is the responsibility of professionals
(e.g., school psychologists) to caution other team members about the risks of
including the DAP in an assessment battery.
Diagnostic accuracy can be influenced by many different variables . For
example , cognitive biases have been demonstrated to exert a negative effect on
accuracy . One well-researched cognitive bias is the hindsight bias. The
following discussion considers this and its potential effect on decision making .

Hindsight Bias
The hindsight bias is a phenomenon that has strong empirica l support
(Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). The term refers to the tendency to overestimate
probability estimates for a given outcome once the outcome is known (Hawkins &
Hastie, 1990). Individuals who are provided with outcome information and then
asked to estimate how likely they would have estimated an occurrence tend to
overestimate the likelihood that they would have applied to the given outcome . In
contrast , individuals without outcome information tend to assign lower
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probabilities to the same outcome.

Fischhoff (1977) described this as a "knew-it-

all-along effect " (p. 349) .
Study of the hindsight bias has reflected the original paradigm established
by Fischhoff (1975). In his original study , he used four obscure events, two
historical events, and two clinical-psychology cases . For each of these betweengroups experiments he provided a brief description of the event followed either by
a list of possible outcomes (foresight) or a sentence presenting the actual
outcome (hindsight) . Participants then were instructed to assign probabilities of
likelihood of occurrence to each outcome as if they did not have outcome
information .
Fischhoff (1975) used the nonparametric sign test for his analysis. Results
showed that individuals with outcome information overestimated the probabilities
they would have assigned if they had not had outcome information. Their beliefs
about the accuracy of their decisions were , therefore, influenced by the presence
of outcome information.

Fischhoff proposed the term "creeping determinism " (p.

288) to describe a process by which outcome information immediately and
automatically is integrated into a person's knowledge about the events preceding
the outcome. People , without realizing it, incorporate the outcome into a
plausible explanation about why the end result had to occur . The effect of this ,
as represented in probability estimates , is to perceive the outcome as inevitable .
It seems as though people seem unable to recapture their original estimates of
likelihood of outcomes once they have outcome knowledge .
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Following these results, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) examined the effect of
the hindsight bias on current news events . They varied the previous studies by
using a within-groups design , in which participants assigned foresight
probabilities . After the outcome was known, participants were asked to
remember their original probabilities , as if they did not have outcome information .
The instructions for this experiment explicitly stated "give the same probabilities
which you gave then (two weeks ago)," (p. 5) thereby addressing the possibility
that participants misunderstood what they were supposed to do.
Again , these researchers found a significant hindsight bias. Participants
rated events they believed had occurred as more likely in hindsight than they had
in foresight, and rated events they believed had not occurred as less likely in
hindsight than they had in foresight. Careful examination of the results showed
that 75% of the participants remembered having assigned higher probabilities
than they actually had to events that they believed had happened . Moreover,
57% of participants reported lower probabilities for events they believed had not
happened .
Arkes et al., ( 1981) attempted to replicate the work of Fischhoff with
physicians making medical diagnoses. They used a case description of a
frequently encountered medical problem , followed by four possible diagnoses .
The physicians were required to assign likelihood estimates to each outcome ,
equaling 100. There were four hindsight groups , each one told that one of the
four diagnoses was the true outcome . Likelihood estimates were examined using
nonparametric analyses (sign test). Results demonstrated that the physicians
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demonstrated the hindsight bias. Yet the bias was restricted to the two
diagnoses assigned the lowest likelihood estimates in foresight. These results
were consistent with previous research suggesting that the hindsight bias is
strongest for events initially judged to be least plausible (Fischhoff, 1977; Wood ,
1978).
Synodinos ( 1986) conducted a between-groups study of this bias using a
gubernatorial race in Hawaii. The researcher was interested in several issues.
First , he hypothesized that participants would be more confident and assign more
accurate probability estimates of percentage of votes in hindsight than in
foresight. In addition , he hypothesized that , in hindsight , people with greate r
political involvement would be motivated to distort their answers in the direction of
the "knew-it-all-along " effect more than people with lower political involvement.
This hypothesis relates to the role of self-esteem as a motivational factor in the
bias.
Participants were required to fill out a questionnaire assessing their degree
of interest, level of knowledge , and perceived importance of the election . They
then were asked to assign a percentage of statewide votes that they believed
each of three candidates would receive (or had received , in hindsight) in the
election (estimates must equal 100% for all three candidates) . Finally, the
participants were asked to indicate their degree of confidence in their predictions.
The researcher used parametric statist ics to analyze the results . Although the
comparisons were in the predicted direction , they did not consistently reach
significance . Synodinos suggested that the participants' accuracy in their pre-
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election (foresight) estimates allowed little room for distortion. Participants
indicated a significantly higher level of confidence in hindsight than in foresight.
The researcher suggested that subjective measures of confidence may be more
sensitive measures of the hindsight effect, and suggested calling it a "sure-allalong" effect (p. 116).
Pennington ( 1981) questioned whether the effects found in laboratory
studies would generalize to real-life , current , news events . He used a British
firefighter 's strike as the news event to be studied. As with the previous studies ,
Pennington provided participants with information about possible outcomes (e.g.,
terms of the settlement and length of strike), and elicited probability estimates in
foresight and at two times in hindsight. Results supported Fischhoff's wo rk in that
the participants demonstrated the typical hindsight pattern of greater probability
associated with the true outcome in hindsight compared with fores ight. Also
included in this study was a condition in which participants were required to
generate their own possible outcomes in foresight. In this case , the typical
hindsight bias was not demonstrated , although results suggested a trend in that
direction . This is an early example of a technique used to decrease the bias.
Finally, Pennington found that when he provided more detailed descriptions
(several hundred words) to participants at the time the judgments were made, the
hindsight effect was stronger than when a brief (150 words) summary of the strike
events was presented .
Although the hindsight bias has been observed fairly consistently , these

studies also suggest that there may be techniques to control or minimize the
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effect. This early research provided a good framework for future studies and
identified potential factors that could account for the hindsight bias, such as
temporal setting (past or future), cognitive processes , and the possibility that
when participants are required to generate spontaneous outcomes, the hindsight
bias may diminish (higher level of processing of information). These factors
stimulated further research (e.g ., Arkes et al., 1988; Connolly & Bukszar, 1990;
Creyer & Ross, 1993; Fischhoff , 1976; Pohl & Hell, 1996; Schkade & Kilbourne,
1991; Sharpe & Adair, 1993), and the latter concept has been useful in the
consideration of debiasing techniques (e.g., Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart ,
1988).
Arkes et al. (1988) evaluated a technique for eliminating the hindsight bias.
They used the classic hindsight paradigm , using foresight and hindsight groups ,
and requested estimations of likelihood of diagnoses . They added an additional
condition whereby some participants in each group were required to generate
reasons , based on the case description, about why they assigned the
probabilities they did. Results suggested that when required to provide reasons
for decisions, participants ' susceptibilities to the hindsight bias decreased. This
study provides support for the assertion that there are techniques that can
diminish the effects of the hindsight bias.
In a review of this literature , Hawkins and Hastie (1990) concluded that the
basic effect of the hindsight bias, higher retrospective probabilities associated
with reported outcomes, is supported across a variety of tasks, and varying time
intervals (minutes to weeks) between initial judgments, outcome , and second
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judgments. They suggest that the cumulative research of this phenomenon
indicate, in most cases, that the hindsight bias can be observed. In addition, the
implications for its effect on decision making can be substantial, because it can
hinder the detection of errors, inflate errors, bias future decisions, and lead to
unduly influenced second opinions.
In an effort to condense the wide body of research on the hindsight bias,
Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) conducted a meta-analysis of 122
studies. They stated that because the prevalence of the bias has been well
established , they were interested in identifying personal or task characteristics
that may moderate the level to which the bias is present , and in evaluating the
practical significance of the bias. The variable analyzed was estimations of effect
size, as this would demonstrate the degree to which the phenomenon was
present in the population (Cohen, 1977, pp. 9-10). The actual test statistics were
transformed to effect sizes, either as Cohen's d or the Pearson product moment
correlation coefficient (r).
The study considered several moderator variables. The first variable was
whether or not the outcome occurred. The researchers referred to Fischhoff and
Beyth's (1975) observation that the hindsight bias seemed to be more
pronounced when people were told that an event had occurred than when told
that it had not occurred. They hypothesized that this was due to people's
cognitive difficulty in processing negative information. The second moderator
variable considered was the participants familiarity (experience or expertise) with
the topic being studied. Two other moderator variables (problem difficulty and
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event novelty) were discussed but not directly evaluated , because data were
unavailable to examine them .
Results of this analysis found the average effect size of all 122 studies
was

r = .17, with a 95% confidence

interval of

r = .14 to .20.

Therefore , they

found support for the phenomenon of the hindsight bias, although its observed
effect size was small. They further discovered that the size of the effect was
correlated with both the participants' familiarity with the task and whether the
outcome information stated that the event did or did not occur. Specifically , they
discovered that the more familiar the participants were with the task, the smaller
the effect size. In addition , in hindsight, people were less likely to reduce their
likelihood estimates when told than an event did not occur , than they were to
increase their likelihood estimates when told that an event did occur.
Post-hoc analyses uncovered an interesting phenomenon . They found
that studies that used an unfamiliar task-event occur model were nearly all paper
and pencil tasks using college undergraduates (in contrast with more
professionals used in familiar task cases). Analysis of these undergraduate
studies suggested that question format might be a moderating variable of the
hindsight bias. Case-history problems generated an average effect size similar to
the familiar task effect size (small effect) , whereas almanac questions generated
an average effect size that was nearly three times larger than any other observed
in the meta-analysis. The present study used undergraduate students and the
case-history model ; therefore these observations are relevant here .
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Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to see if the inclusion of projective
information would increase the magnitude of the hindsight bias. A premise of the
study was that projective techniques (e.g., DAP) are measures of limited clinical
utility, and , in fact , actually may serve to decrease the overall accuracy of
diagnostic decisions. The primary quest ions addressed were:
1. Will the probabilities assigned to reasons for difficulty be similar, regardless of
whether outcome information is provided (replicat ion of hindsight bias
research) .
2. To what extent is the hindsight bias influenced by the inclusion of projective
data? I hypothesized that features that are inherent in projective techniques,
such as the ambiguous nature of stimuli and subjective scoring and
interpretation , would combine with the process of creeping determinism to
make the outcomes with the drawing seem inevitab le to participants, resulting
in higher likelihood estimates given by participants who received hindsight
information and a drawing.

Method
Participants
A total of 180 undergraduate students at the University of Rhode Island
volunteered to participate in this study from a number of different choices
designed to prov ide them with experience in psychological research . They

received psychology course credit in exchange for their participation . Sign-up
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sheets were designed so students who had participated in another study on the
hindsight bias being conducted during the same semester were excluded.
Participants were matched for gender , and randomly assigned to one of six
groups , for a total of 30 per group . Appendix A shows the consent form for
research the participants were required to sign.
The mean age of the sample was 19.5 years , with a standard deviation of
2.5 years . Within each condition , the age distribution was similar . The
distribution of gender was 28.9% male, and 71.1% female . Participants' race was
distributed as follows: 84.1% Caucasian , 5.7% African Ame rican, 4.0% Hispanic ,
and 6.2% Other; of the 180 participants , four did not provide information
regarding race. Most participants (80.6%) received credit for an introductory
psychology class, whereas 2.8% were from a sophomore-level course, and
16.6% were from a junior or senior-level psychology course . These variables
were distributed similarly across the six different conditions .

Case Materials
The following was a case description constructed to portray a 15 year-old
boy who was experiencing school related difficulties . It provides information that
often is included in psychoeducational reports , but in a style appropriate for
understanding by non-professionals :

We would greatly appreciate your taking

a few minutes to

read the following case description , which is part of a study on

identifying reasons for school-related problems . It is the kind of
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case that often is refeffed for evaluation to psychologists who
work in school settings.

We would like you to decide what

probability you would have assigned to each of two possible
reasons, had you been the school psychologist evaluating the

case.
A teacher expressed concern about a fifteen-year old boy
who has been earning failing grades in school and who appears
isolated and withdrawn.

One exception to this observation,

however, is that he recently had two uncharacteristic arguments
with peers that resulted in teacher intervention.
A review of his background information indicates that he
has had trouble both in the past and more recently. Leaming to
read was difficult for him, and he required extra help in both the
first and second grades. He has never been a good reader, and
rarely reads for pleasure. His grades reflect these difficulties.
He is generally a C student, although his reading and language
arts grades have occasionally been Os, with one F. In recent
years, he has struggled with both his English and Spanish
classes. In contrast, he consistently has eamed Bs in Math, and
he describes this subject as interesting and relatively easy for
him. In addition, he always has been described as a nervous
boy, getting uptight before exams and oral presentations.
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He is reported to be an avid basketball fan, both as a
player and observer . Over the past several months, however,
his interest in basketball has diminished. His teachers and
friends describe him as gloomy lately, and state that he does not
seem to be interested in things he normally enjoys.
He recently was referred to the school psychologist who
conducted an evaluation of these school-related difficulties . If
you had been the school psychologist evaluating this case, what

is the probability you would assign to each of the following two
possible reasons for the school-related difficulties as the primary
one?

Assign an estimate to each, making sure they add to

100%.
Social-emotional problem

%

-----

(e.g., moodiness , difficulty relating to others ,
problems with expressing feelings)

Leaming problem

- - --

-

%

(e.g., slow learner , problems with attention or
memory , difficulty with thinking or reasoning)

In order to determine if the reasons for difficulty identified subsequent to
the case description were approximately equally likely, the case was piloted with
15 graduate students in psychology (8 school-psychology and 7 clinicalpsychology students). The mean probability assigned to social-emotional
problems as the primary difficulty was 53.9% (SD= 16.7%, range= 25% to 75%),
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and learning problems was 46.1% (SD= 16.7%, range= 25% to 75%). A 1-test
for dependent samples showed that the reasons generated were generally
perceived as equally likely (1< 1).
A drawing of a person also was developed (see Appendix B). Included in
the drawing were signs often interpreted as suggesting either social-emotional
problems or learning problems (Machover , 1949; Ogdon , 1990). For example ,
pointy fingers frequently are interpreted as signs of aggression , and have been
suggested to indicate severe mental disturbance (Buck , 1948; Machover , 1949;
Urban, 1963). Shoulders omitted often are seen as indicating feelings of
inferiority or depression , and crossed eyes have been interpreted as indicative of
learning or cognitive difficulties. When evaluated using the OAP: Quantitative
Scoring System (Naglieri , 1988), the drawing represents a measure of nonverbal
cognitive development that is within normal limits (Standard Score = 107; M =
100, SD= 15). In addition, when scored using the OAP: SPED (Naglieri,
McNeish , & Bardos, 1991) the drawing is not considered to be clinically significant
(T-score = 40; M = 50, SD= 10). Thus , it is reasonable to infer that the drawing
does not clearly reflect empirically supported interpretation as either
developmentally or psychosocially pathological.

Procedure
The design for this study is illustrated in Table 1. Participants were
matched for gender , then 30 were assigned to each of six conditions : (F1) a
fores ight condition with no drawing ; (F2) a fores ight condit ion with a drawing ; (H1)
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a hindsight condition for learning problems with no drawing ; (H2) a hindsight
condition for social-emotional problems with no drawing; (H3) a hindsight
condition for learning problems with a drawing; and (H4) a hindsight drawing for
social-emot ional problems with a drawing . The 30 participants in the foresight
condition were given the case description previously described.
Each of the two hindsight groups had an extra sentence inserted between
the two sentences in the first paragraph of instructions to the foresight group. The
two sentences (one for each of the hindsight groups) were as follows : "This is a

description of a boy who is experiencing difficulties primarily due to emotional
problems , " or "This is a description of a boy who is experiencing difficulties
primarily due to learning problems ."
Foresight-drawing group participants received the same descriptive
information as the foresight participants , except that a drawing of a person was
inserted after the final paragraph , preceded by the statement: "During the

evaluation , he made the following drawing ." The two hindsight-drawing groups
differed from the hindsight ones in a similar way.
This study included two independent variables and one dependent
variable . The independent variables were : (a) drawing , and (b) outcome. The
dependent variable was the probability assigned for each of the possible reasons
for difficulty, ranging from 0 to 100% .
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Results
Figures 1 through 6 show the frequencies of probabilities for social
emotional problems and learning problems by each group . Table 2 shows the
mean probability assigned to each possible reason by each group. Also included
in the Table {in parenthesis) is the number of participants whose probability for
each reason exceeded the corresponding foresight estimate . I used two different
statistical methods to analyze these data: one non-parametric and the other
parametric . Because the probabilities for each outcome in the present study were
ipsitive for each participant (i.e., r g = 100%), these dependent measures clearly
were related . Thus , I used the non-parametric (distribution-free) procedures
employed in previous hindsight bias studies {e.g., Arkes et al., 1981; Fischhoff ,
1975). As an alternative analysis , I isolated one level of the dependent variable
(i.e., Q values assigned to social-emotional problems) and analyzed these
measures using parametric statistics (analysis of variance).

Non-parametric Analysis
I used the sign test to compare the number of participants who assigned
higher probabilities in hindsight than the probabilities assigned in foresight. The
sign test is a procedure that computes the differences between two variables for
all cases and classifies the difference as either positive , negative , or tied. If the
two variables are distributed similarly, then the number of positive and negative
differences will not differ significantly (Glass & Hopkins , 1996) . My results
demonstrated that , overall , 73 out of 120 (i.e., 61%) hindsight participants
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assigned higher probabilities to the known-to-have- occurred outcome than the
corresponding foresight estimate (i = 2 .28 ; p = .011).
I also conducted separate sign tests for the following hindsight vs .
foresight comparisons: (a) no drawing, and (b) drawing . In the no drawing
condition , 37 out of 60 (i.e., 62%) of the hindsight participants assigned higher
probabilities to the known-to- have-occurred outcome than in the corresponding
foresight group (i = 1.68; Q = .047) ; whereas , in the drawing condition 36 out of
60 (i.e., 60%) participants assigned higher probabilities~=

1.42; Q = .078) .

Finally, I also compared hindsight versus foresight probabilities within each
drawing by outcome condition , that is: (a) drawing, social-emotional ; (b) drawing,
learning; (c) no drawing, social-emotional ; and (d) no drawing , learning. In the
drawing, social-emotional group , 22 of 30 (i.e., 73%) of the hindsight participants
assigned higher probability estimates to social-emotional problems than the
corresponding foresight group ~ = 2.41; Q = .008). In the drawing , learning group ,
14 of 30 (i.e., 47%) of the hindsight participants assigned higher probabilities than
the foresight group (i

=.44; Q =.330.

In the no drawing, social-emotional group ,

18 of 30 (i.e., 60%) of the hindsight participants gave higher estimates than the
corresponding foresight group (i = .91; Q = .181). In the no drawing, learning
group, 19 of 30 (i.e., 63%) of the hindsight participants assigned higher
probabilities than the corresponding foresight estimate~=

1.28; Q = .100). My

results demonstrate that the only individual group that demonstrated the bias (at
Q < .05) was the hindsight for social-emotional problems with the drawing group.
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Parametric Analysis
I also analyzed the data with a two by three between groups analysis of
variance test (ANOVA) . The design was Ax B, where A= drawing (two levels:
either drawing or no drawing) , and B = outcome (three levels : no outcome given ,
social-emotional problem , or learning problem) . To address the previously
mentioned concern regarding the dependence of the two probability estimates
provided by each participant , the probability est imate assigned to social-emotional
problems (versus learning) arbitrarily was chosen as the single dependent
variable . The ANOVA showed a main effect for the outcome variable,

E (2, 174)

= 5.273 , Q = .006 , but not for the drawing variable , E (1, 174) = 3.364, Q = .068, or
for the interaction between these two variables , E < 1. The ANOVA summary
table appears in Table 2 . As a follow-up analysis , I used the Tukey Honestly
Significant Difference Test (Tukey HSD). This analysis compared each of the
three outcome groups . I found that the only comparison that yielded a significant
result was the hindsight condition for learning problems compared with the
hindsight condition for social-emotional problems (Q = .003).
Finally, I examined the results of the ANOVA to determine effect size of
the significant result as well as the power of the non-significant results. The
method for calculating effect size was omega-squared, measuring the proportion
of variance accounted for (Keppel , 1982). For the outcome variable ro2 was .057 ,
a small effect.

I examined the power of the non-significant result to examine the

likelihood of Type II errors, that is how likely it was that this design did not detect
an effect of the drawing or interaction , when one in fact was present. The power
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of the drawing condition was moderate (P = .554). This implies that if an effect of
the drawing was present , it was 55% likely that my study was not powerful
enough to detect it. The power of the interaction was quite low {J3= .923). In
terms of the likelihood that I would have found a significant interaction if it were
present , my chances were minimal, or it was 92% likely that I would not detect an
effect if it were present. Therefore , the interpretation of the non-sign ificant result
is potentially misleading. Further study will need to consider this issue in order to
decrease the likelihood of a Type II error .

Discussion
These results provide support for the first research question , regarding the
replication of previous research on the hindsight bias . As noted, many different
methods have been used to measure the hindsight bias. Both parametric and
non-parametric statistics have been used. Consistent with Arkes et al. (1981)
and Fischhoff (1975) , my study demonstrated the hindsight bias using the nonparametric sign test. The bias was limited to one spec ific hindsight condition , the
hindsight social-emotional with drawing group .
Arkes et al. (1981) and Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) also found the bias to
be present in only some of their groups . They concluded that the hindsight bias
tends to be stronger for those events initially judged to be least plausible (low
base-rate events). In the present study , each outcome was deemed equally likely
given the data provided (approximately 50/50 as indicated by the pilot study and
the foresight , no drawing estimates) . Therefore , other explanations should be
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considered . Pennington (1981) suggested that more data tend to increase the
hindsight bias. This explanation is not supported by the present study. In fact ,
the opposite was observed in terms of the drawing vs. no drawing groups. The
no-drawing group demonstrated the bias, whereas the drawing condition overall
did not.
If the observations of Ark es et al. ( 1981) and Fischhoff ( 1975) are
generalizable, that least plausible outcomes tend to demonstrate the bias,
whereas higher base-rate outcomes are less likely, then the logical question may
be: Why did the drawing social-emotional group demonstrate the bias at all?
Perhaps there was something inherent in the kind of information given. If the
DAP tends to be interpreted in terms of emotional functioning more frequently ,
then the hindsight information may have become more salient to participants than
it was in the other conditions. The projective hypothesis , advocating subjective
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, combined with the concept of creeping
determinism , may offer a plausible explanation . To reiterate , creeping
determinism refers to the observation that reporting an event's occurrence
increases its perceived inevitability . If participants in my study, in fact, were
susceptible to the effects of this cognitive process, and the ambiguity of the
drawing was persuasive enough to encourage bias toward social-emotional
problems , then the bias would be expected as observed. This question could be
evaluated further in subsequent research .
Characteristics of the sample population also may provide insight into the

observed results. Specifically , there may be differences in the way professionals
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and nonprofessionals analyze case histories. Although undergraduate students
have been used in previous research of the hindsight bias, it has been shown that
they are more likely to demonstrate the bias when considering historical or
almanac data than case-history data (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham , 1991;
Fischhoff , 1977).
The second research question I was interested in asked to what extent the
hindsight bias was affected by inclusion of the OAP. The results of the ANOVA
suggest that the outcome information had a significant overall effect on assigned
probabilities. Specifically , the combined hindsight learning groups (with and
without drawing) differed reliably from the combined hindsight social-emotional
groups (with and without drawing). Each of these means were in the expected
direction, with the hindsight social-emotional group assigning probabilities to
social-emotional problems higher than 50 and the hindsight learning group
assigning probabilities lower than 50.
The drawing condition overall did not demonstrate a reliable effect on
likelihood estimates. Yet , when the drawing was presented with social-emotional
outcome information , estimates were significantly higher than when the drawing
was presented with learning outcome information . This suggests that the
combined effect of the type of outcome information (social-emotional problems)
and the drawing exerted an effect on the way the case information was
interpreted. In other words, simply including the drawing with the outcome
information for social-emotional problems persuaded participants to interpret the
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case information differently . An interesting follow-up to these observat ions would
be to examine the incremental validity effect of the drawing .
In addition, it may also be useful to examine more closely the differential
effect of the DAP on cognitive versus social-emotional information . For example ,
a majority of the literature on the DAP refers to its use as a measure of socialemotional functioning . The Chapmans ' ( 1967) study demonstrated that the
presence of drawings elicits stereotypes of social-emotional functioning by both
trained clinicians and untrained college students . For the purpose of this study ,
the drawing that was used was given to a group of students in an undergraduate
psychology class . They were asked to provide qualitative descriptors of the
drawing . All of the students made statements about the person who drew the
picture, even though that was not the instruction given . In addition, 98% of the
statements referred to the social-emot ional functioning of the person who drew
the picture, whereas only a few referred to cognitive functioning . A sample of
these statements appears in Appendix C. This is an interest ing observation,
because the DAP is a better predictor of non-verbal cognit ive functioning than of
social-emotional funct ioning . The influence of the picture on the way other
information is interpreted should be considered by practicing clinicians who claim
that the worst effect will be no effect at all. This question also should be
considered further in subsequent research .
The observed effect size of the outcome variable was consistent with
results reported by Christensen-Szalanski and Willham's (1991) meta-analysis of
122 studies of the hindsight bias. They found an overall small effect size for the
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hindsight bias. Within that analysis , Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991)
examined several moderator variables and found that the hindsight effect was
correlated with both the participants' familiarity with the task and whether the
outcome information stated that the event did or did not occur . They concluded
that the more familiar the participants were with the task, the smaller the effect of
the hindsight bias. In addition, they observed that people were less likely to
reduce their probability estimates retrospective ly when told that an event did not
occur, than they were to increase their likelihood estimates retrospectively when
told that an event did occur.
Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) also examined subgroups of
their sample. A large number of studies were conducted using undergraduates .
These studies tended to demonstrate the bias more than any other group (i.e.,
the average effect size demonstrated a medium effect). Within this group, they
found that students who were given case-history problems (such as in the
present study) generated a small effect size, whereas almanac type questions
generated an average effect size nearly three times larger than any other that
was observed. Therefore , my results are consistent with those found in the metaanalysis.
A potentially confounding influence in this design is that the amount of
information in the case-description-plus-drawing conditions is greater than the
case-description-only conditions. As noted, previous research has suggested
that as amount of information increases , the magnitude of the hindsight bias is

likely to increase (Pennington , 1981). Pennington 's study compared longer

41
versus shorter verbal descriptions , whereas this study examined the inclusion of
additional information in the form of a draw ing. Within the drawing condition , the
bias was observed only in the group that was given social -emotional outcome
information , suggesting that another explanation should be considered . Due to
the differential effects that were observed , isolat ing potential reasons for such
differences (e.g ., illusory beliefs based on projective information versus
differential amounts of information) should be addressed in subsequent research .
Given the fact that the observed hindsight bias was in the minimal range ,
one must consider the cost of this cognitive error in daily functioning when
deciding whether or not to attempt to decrease its effect. Although the results of
this study are consistent with previous research , it would be of both theoretical
and practical interest to see how practicing psychologists would respond in a
similar situation. In addition , the issue of the potential differential effects of the
OAP depending on the type of information (case versus almanac) included with it
should be evaluated further .
Implications
My study provided support for the hindsight bias consistent with previous
research. When non-parametric statistics and effect size analyses were used,
the bias was observed . The combined strength of these methods lead to a fair
degree of confidence in asserting that the bias is, in fact , present. In contrast ,
parametric tests , that compared the actual observed means of the foresight and
hindsight groups , did not demonst rate the bias. The concern regarding the

relatedness of the probability estimates is a valid one . With my use of parametric
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statistics I attempted to diminish the effect (by using only the probabilities
assigned to social-emotional functioning).
I have identified an issue here that has not been addressed in previous
study of the hindsight bias. Specifically, given the differential results I observed
when using parametric versus non-parametric statistics, study of the statistics of
other hindsight bias research is warranted. Perhaps the bias is not as robust as
previously believed . Alternatively , the construct of hindsight bias may be
understood differently based on varying methodology . When non-parametric
methods are used, one compares the number of participants who assigned higher
probabilities than the mean foresight estimate , whereas the parametric methods
compare actual means.
Another important result of my study was the observation that the OAP
demonstrates a differential effect based on the kind of information with which it is
presented. Given the vast amount of information provided during a
psychoeducational evaluation, there remains a substantial risk that clinicians will
be susceptible to the same cognitive errors demonstrated by this college
population . As noted previously , clearly the worst effect is more significant than
no effect. In fact, these kinds of beliefs actually can increase the likelihood that
errors in diagnosis will occur.
Finally, it is important to consider the applied usefulness of the results I
have presented. Although some equivocal results were observed, it is clear that
individuals are susceptible to cognitive biases like the one I have reviewed . In

addition, depending on analytic technique , projective methods (specifically the
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DAP), exert an observable influence on how individuals interpret other
information . Given these observations , and the implications for faulty decision
making and diagnosis, these issues should be examined using practicing
clinicians.

Limitations
There are limitations to this study that should be considered when making
implications based on the results. In this study I considered one dependent
variable, thereby potentially restricting the observation of the hindsight bias . As
noted, Synodinos (1986) used both probabilities and degree of confidence as
dependent variables. Synodinos reported that confidence might be a more
sensitive measure of the hindsight effect, because it directly addresses
participants ' perceived accuracy . Although Fischhoff (1975) has clearly defined
the hindsight phenomenon, perhaps further consideration of the construct itself
should be considered.
It is important to use caution when making inferences about a particular
population. Specifically, although my study demonstrates susceptibility to the
hindsight bias and the negative impact of the DAP, the generalizability of these
observations is questionable. It remains unclear how practicing clinicians would
consider the same information used here. Naturally , in a real evaluation situation,
the clinician would have access to more information than is included here.
Consequently , although these results are interesting , their relevance to actual

diagnostic situations remains questionable .
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Conclusion
This study considered the effect of the inclusion of a human figure draw ing
on the hindsight bias . A review of the development of the Draw-a-Person test
suggests that its clinical usefulness and psychometric properties are limited .
Contrary to previously expressed belief about the benign effect of inclusion of the
DAP, it was demonstrated that the OAP can exert an observable influence on the
way in which other information is interpreted . In addition , this study examined the
construct of the hindsight bias and proposed that the different methods of
analyses that have been used may account for the variable observation of the
bias.
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Table 1
Design of the Study

No Outcome Given Social-Emotional - LearningProblems Outcome Problems
Given
Outcome Given

No Drawing
Given

Drawing Given

¼ assigned to 5-E
problems

¼ assigned to 5-E
problems

¼ assigned to 5-E
problems

¼ assigned to teaming
0roblems

¼ assigned to teaming
problems

¼ assigned to
~earning problems

'°/4assigned to 5-E
problems

'% assigned to S-E
1Problems

~1/oassigned to 5 -E
problems

¼ assigned to learning
oroblems

% assigned to learning
problems

% assigned to
~earning problems
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Table 2
Mean Probability Assigned to Each Outcome

Outcome Evaluated
Outcome

Social-Emotional

Learning

N

Provided

Problem (S-E)

Problem (L)

Foresight

30

None

51.83

48.17

Hindsight

30

S-E

55.60 (18)

44.40

Hindsight

30

L

44.50

55.50 (19)

Foresight

30

None

55.40

44.60

Hindsight

30

S-E

63.67 (22)

36.33

Hindsight

30

L

50.00

50.00 (14)

Group
No Drawing

Drawing

Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants whose

probability estimate for that particular outcome exceeds the corresponding
foresight estimate.
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Comparisons of Hindsight Bias and
Projective Drawing Conditions

Sum of

Mean
Square

df

Square

F

Sig.

Drawing

1467 .756

1

1467 .756

3.364

.068

Outcome

4601 .633

2

2300 .817

5.273

.006

152.878

2

76.439

.175

.839

75920.73

174

436.326

Drawing X Outcome
Error

Total

97348.00

180
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Figure 1
Foresight ; Without drawing
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Figure 2
Foresight ; With drawing
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Figure 3
Hindsight (learning); Without drawing
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Figure 4
Hindsight (social-emotional); Without drawing
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Figure 5
Hindsight (learning); With drawing
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Figure 6
Hindsight (social-emotional); With drawing
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Appendix A

The University of Rhode Island
Department of Psychology

A Study of Decision Making Strategies Among College Students
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH

You have been asked to take part in a research project described below.
The researcher will explain the project to you in detail. You should feel free to
ask questions . If you have more questions later , Elizabeth Dufresne (783-3909),
the person mainly responsible for the study , will discuss them with you. You must
be at least 18 years old to be in this research project.
You have been asked to take part in the study that evaluates how people
identify reasons for problems . If you decide to take part in this study here is what
will happen: You will be given a brief description about an individual. You will be
asked to answer a few questions about this description. In addition, you will be
asked to fill out a questionnaire with various questions about you (age, year in
college).
We do not expect that there are any risks or discomforts associated with
this study . If, upon completion of the study , you feel any discomfort, please
contact the person mainly responsible for the study.
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Participation in this study will fulfill partial requirements for your
Introductory Psychology course. Appropriate documentation of your participation
will be made upon completion .
Your part in this study is confidential. None of the information will identify
you by name. All records will be stored in a separate place from the consent
forms so that confidentiality is maintained .
The decision to participate in this research is up to you . You do not have
to participate and you can refuse to answer any question.
Participation in this study is not expected to be harmful or injurious to you.
However , if this study causes you any injury, you should call Elizabeth Dufresne
(783-3909) or W. Grant Willis , Ph.D., Faculty Adv isor (874-4245).
If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed , you may
discuss your complaints with Elizabeth Dufresne . In addition , you may contact
the office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies , Research and Outreach , 70
Lower College Road, Suite 2, University of Rhode Island, Kingston , Rhode Island,
telephone : (410) 874-2635.
You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered.
Your signature on this form means that you understand the information and you
agree to participate in th is study .

Signature of Participant

Signature of Researcher
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Appendix B
Draw-a-Person
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Appendix C
Sample Statements From Pilot of Drawing
"The character looks stressed, which probably represents how he (the
artist) feels ."
"He feels inferior (on big piece of paper , drew small person). "
"He is unhappy and confused ." ''Very attentive . Looking forward , big
ears ."
"The eyes made me think that he is confused and overwhel med, stressed. "
"He does not conform to standards and ideals-the number of fingers on the
boy is not the standard 5."
"The picture seemed sad so the boy might also be upset about
something ."
"The hands look monstrous , perhaps this boy has some anger or
violence ."
"Everything on the left side of the body is drawn bigger, perhaps this boy
has some kind of body dysmorphic disorder. "
"This boy has a low self-esteem - the hands are unique and the boy in the
picture is not smil ing."
"Mood of boy gloomy when he drew the picture ."
"The boy is mentally disabled. " "He has delusiona l problems. "
"He is unhappy when he drew this picture ."
"The boy probably feels everyone has a monster inside of them ."
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"He is underdeveloped ." "Often when things are left out of a picture such
as the neck and wrists that can be signs of a lower developmental level."
"It is by a boy who is mentally retarded or autistic (some lack of
intelligence)."
"He is not that intelligent because body parts are not accurate. "
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